The Middle East’s Slippery Slope of Nuclear Deterrence
Few international treaties have a future as tenuous as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known to the public as the Iran nuclear deal. Since its conception by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Iran in 2015, the agreement has seen several major setbacks, which culminated in the United States’ withdrawal from it in 2018 followed by Iran’s de-facto suspension of its commitments after the killing of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani. The deal’s potential to thwart the Middle East’s nuclearization is further diminished by the upcoming presidential elections in both countries, each contest promising uncertain outcomes and lowering the possibility that the JCPOA will be resuscitated.
This does not bode well for the region not just from geopolitical but also from humanitarian perspectives. The closer Tehran comes to obtaining military nuclear capabilities, the more its rival, Saudi Arabia, will strive to compensate for the resultant power imbalance. This may produce a domino effect where both nations develop nuclear technology and turn to more aggressive foreign policy, to the detriment of regional stability. The world has already witnessed what this brinkmanship could precipitate: stories of malnourished and enunciated Yemeni children are too abundant and disturbing to be brushed under the carpet. Thus, much hangs on the JCPOA’s continuation with respect to the Middle East.
Certainly, there were concrete reasons why the Iran nuclear deal started to crack so quickly after its adoption, and not placing some blame on the Islamic Republic itself would be mistaken. For instance, in violation of the treaty, the country’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium has tripled since November 2019, far exceeding the treaty-established limits, with which its leadership swore to comply. In addition, Iran has reportedly been storing processed uranium at a facility not declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency, which also goes against the JCPOA.
The fact that these breaches were committed by the Iranian side makes it certain that Tehran is still interested in employing its nuclear program for geostrategic purposes, and unless there is cooperation among Europe, Russia, China, and the United States, this situation will remain in Iran’s favor. Acquisition of atomic weapons by Iran spells peril for the region. Though a direct attack on Israel or Saudi Arabia is unlikely, the local ruling elites will undeniably feel emboldened by the nuclear arsenal to intervene in the neighboring states. The regime’s backing of Hezbollah and Hamas, encroachments in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, and the Iranian navy’s customary blockade of the Gulf all stand as testimony to how aggressively Iran pursues its external policy aims. Nuclear armament is only bound to make it more aggressive.
The problem does not end there. As revealed by the 2011 Arab Spring events, the domino effect has a major role in determining the course of local politics; whence we should expect these dynamics to aggravate the Arab countries and prompt some, namely Saudi Arabia, to counter Iran’s nuclear developments. What first seems a slippery slope argument becomes palpable reality, when we consider the following points.
Firstly, Riyadh has already butt heads with Tehran on many issues. For instance, Iran allegedly finances the Houthi rebels, who are fighting the Saudi Arabian forces in Yemen and launching missile attacks on the nation’s oil facilities. For this reason, a sudden improvement in relations cannot be expected, all the more since the kingdom would feel threatened by the Iranian nuclear weapons and would desire to retaliate. Here, it is important to note that its government does not depend on the taxpayer money, but on revenues from oil to sustain its political ambitions. Whilst ordinary citizens naturally have little say in a monarchy, these circumstances further deprive them of any levers on the government to alter the country’s course. This suggests the Saudi authorities may take far greater political risks than their Western counterparts and thus go for the nuclearization option. In fact, their daredevil spirit has already manifested itself on several occasions, such as the recent depreciation of oil prices following Russia’s departure from OPEC+.
Second, though weaponizing nuclear infrastructure is expensive, time-consuming, and likely to encourage international condemnation, these obstacles are shaky at best given the current conjuncture. The world stands divided over the question of the Iranian nuclear program, and nothing will arguably be different in the Saudi scenario. In 2018, Mohammed Bin Salman declared that the monarchy was willing to build “as many as 16 nuclear power plants” within the next two decades, stressing that nuclear armament was not off the table. It is worth noting that the Saudi military already possesses nuclear warhead delivery technology: the Chinese-made medium-range ballistic missile batteries it owns have the ability to be equipped with them. The complications of pursuing a nuclear option are not enough to deter Saudi Arabia.
Third, Saudi Arabia could solicit the assistance of other countries in creating the bomb. Whilst America would hardly accept such a deal, Pakistan and Israel have a shared interest in containing Iran and might consider this cooperation. For Pakistan, this would be a natural choice as ties between the two states have historically been strong. Saudi Arabia helped finance Pakistan’s own nuclear program and bailed it out on thirteen different occasions. Contrastingly, Iran has arguably moved closer toward India. For Islamabad, assisting the Saudis could therefore form part of a strategy to contain Indian activity in the region.
As for Israel, the notion of Arab-Israeli collaboration is not as unfeasible as it sounds. In the past, Israel, the only Middle Eastern country to possess nuclear warheads, has prevented its neighbors’ attempts to acquire nuclear parity with Israel. On one occasion, it destroyed an Iraqi atomic reactor and sent ripples across the world in what is known as Operation Opera; even the US rebuked its historical ally for that attack. Some have also attributed the Stuxnet malware attack on Iran’s Natanz Nuclear Facility in 2005 to Israel. Therefore, Israel will be just as upset by Iran’s nuclearization as Saudi Arabia, and searching for new measures aimed at Tehran’s auspicious nuclear program, it will have to consider bolstering nuclear deterrence. If we recall Bin Salman’s overtures towards Israel, the prospects of the two working together are especially realistic.
It would be frightening for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, and it would be even more frightening for Saudi Arabia to follow suit. The Middle East might not survive greater tensions between them, whilst they wrestle for regional hegemony-their confrontations in Iraq and Yemen could easily become bloodier and more numerous. Add to that the potential of Israeli interference and the situation looks outright catastrophic. Nuclear armament will exacerbate existing and precipitate new conventional clashes, and non-nuclear states will have to choose sides. As history has shown, peace is a luxury in this region, and further destabilization would spell chaos and destruction.
As the world approaches the two elections that may decide the fate of the JCPOA and the Middle East altogether, it is important that our politicians recognize the need to act on the Iran nuclear question. It behooves the West to reign in the conflicting factions in Iran and the United States and either restore their compliance to the existing deal or create a superior agreement. Otherwise, the slippery slope of nuclearization might have the Middle East slide into further turmoil and conflict.
Originally published at https://exponentsmag.org on July 23, 2020.